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Legitimizing Military Action through 'Rape-as-a-Weapon' Discourse in Libya: 
Critical Feminist Analysis 
 
Contemporary discourse on sexual(ized) violence in armed conflicts represents a powerful source for 
legitimization of highly controversial military interventions. Recent outburst of gender-responsive security 
studies calls for enhanced protection of women and girls from widespread and systematic sexual(ized) 
violence. Yet, military operations reproduce the Western masculine hegemony rather than providing inclusive 
and apolitical assistance to victims of sexual assaults. The article aims to critically assess discourse on sexual 
violence in a case of military intervention initiated under the rubric of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 
namely Libya. The case study indicates a set of discursive strategies exercised by Western political 
representatives, NGOs and even more expressively by the media to legitimize military campaign. Typically, 
sexual(ized) violence is presented as a weapon of war, used by one of the conflicting parties without an 
adequate response of the state. This is followed by urgent calls for international action, willingly carried out by 
Western powers. The simplified narrative of civilized protectors vs. savage aggressors must be challenged as it 
exploits the problem of sexual(ized) violence in order to legitimize politically motivated actions. 
Key words: sexual(ized) violence; Libya; critical discourse analysis; military interventions; feminism 
 
Introduction 
Humanitarian military interventions in other countries have traditionally been highly 
controversial projects requiring a convincing justification. In the past two decades, there has 
been an evolving powerful framework of the Responsibility to Protect (hereafter R2P), 
constituting an effective source of legitimacy through protection of vulnerable civilians in 
crisis situations. In particular, the protection of ‘women and children’ in warzones forms one 
of the basic building blocks of the discourse legitimizing contemporary international 
interventionism (Enloe 2000; Carpenter 2013).1 Based on this assumption, this work 
                                                          
1 In her work, Carpenter (2006) argues that the gender essentialist ideas affect, and ultimately undermine, the 
principle of civilian immunity. This makes women and children to be most commonly identified as ‘innocent’ 
civilians, an idea based largely on the argument that these groups are the most vulnerable during a conflict. 
Carpenter critiques such essentialism, arguing that exclusion of battle-aged men from civilian status 
undermines the moral logic of the civilian immunity principle itself (Ibid). Carpenter builds her argument on 
the work of Cynthia Enloe, who explains the female innocence in the context of Gulf War reporting: 
“womenandchildren rolls easily off network tongues because in network minds women are family members 
rather than independent actors, presumed to be almost childlike in their innocence about international 
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critically analyzes how legitimacy of military operation was constructed in the 2011 crisis in 
Libya, utilizing the discourse of sexual(ized)2 violence as a weapon of war. The empirical part 
focuses on various discursive strategies used prior to the intervention and demonstrates 
their legitimization effect on otherwise disputable NATO military campaign, while 
strengthening the identity of the alliance as a security provider.   
In international politics, there appears a clear tendency to use the rape-as-a-
weapon-of-war narrative to emphasize the strategic nature of violence. The legitimacy of 
contemporary interventionism is based exclusively on the principle of protection of civilians 
from clearly-defined and internationally recognized criminal acts (Evans 2009).3 Sexual(ized) 
violence in armed conflicts perfectly serves the strategic efforts of actors aiming to 
legitimize a military intervention. Rape, often used as a synonym for the wider problem of 
sexual(ized) violence, attracts enormous attention of the public and civil society, as well as 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
realpolitik... states exist, this media story implies, to protect womenandchildren...” (Enloe 1993, 166). For this 
work, the notion of innocence is crucial, together with the call for protection. Since sexual(ised) violence is 
often considered a tactics/strategy aimed against women (and children), it targets female innocence and 
vulnerability, the very notions of civilian womanhood to be protected by the male soldier. Thus, reporting on 
widescale and systematic rape in a conflict against the nameless civilian ‘womenandchildren’ becomes the 
most acute call for action to protect this very group. Similarly to Enloe and Carpenter, we wish to challenge the 
notion of ‘womenandchildren’ and the exclusions it brings, but for the purposes of this article, we use the 
concept to challenge the international protectionist discourse. 
2 We use the term sexual(ized) violence based on our academic hesitation to define such violence as purely 
sexual – based on sexual desire or urge. Here, the term ‘sexual’ violence is most commonly used to describe 
acts of rape, genital mutilation, forced marriage, sexual slavery, etc. The debate on whether violence is an 
inherently sexual phenomenon, no matter its manifestation, is still on-going in the academia and many 
researchers dispute the claim that war-time rape and other acts considered to be sexual violence lack the 
element of sexual desire. For the purpose of this work, the term sexual(ized) violence refers to gendered 
violence with sexual manifestation. Rather than using the term ‘sexual violence’, utilising the term sexual(ized) 
violence opens up the possibility of removal of sexual desire and primary targeting of the sexuality of the 
victim. In other words, although the violence described by this work may have been in some cases result of 
sexual desire/directed tactical plan or policy, there is a possibility that such violence was a result of other 
factors and motivations, such as revenge, psychological deprivation, peer pressure, etc. Thus, without 
addressing the roots of such violence on perpetrator’s side, we believe that using the term sexual(ized) 
violence opens the space for this research to include acts that may normally not fall under the strict category 
of ‘sexual’ violence in its traditional understanding.  
3 These are: genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Despite the efforts to 
operationalize the R2P concept, its implementation rests on the interpretation of violence in line with the four 
types, which includes systematic rape. 
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the media and policy-makers.4 As a result, politically motivated, systematic rape becomes a 
powerful source of legitimacy when applying use of force under the auspices of R2P. 
Privileging the rape-as-a-weapon discourse inevitably leads to marginalization of 
other victims, as well as violent sexual acts that do not fit the narrative, which contradicts 
the very basic R2P premise of humanitarian apolitical protection. The case reflects the 
exclusive emphasis put on particular groups indicated as the “barbaric rapists” depending 
on the political motivations to defeat the ruling government. Although various NGOs usually 
report more complex patterns of sexual(ized) violence, political representatives, as well as 
the media, tend to portray the situation with a clear attempt to legitimize the protectionist 
intervention.      
In effect, hegemonic discourse on sexual(ized) violence as a weapon of war 
reproduces the Western power based international order; one that rests on the principle of 
the deployment of civilizing missions to third countries. The intervening states construct 
legitimacy of their actions through de-legitimization of non-Western cultures, stereotyping 
them as un-civilized, essentially violent and thus failing to protect ‘their’ women and 
children. Therefore, the implementation of an R2P conception based on protection from 
widespread and systematic sexual(ized) violence must be challenged through a deeper 
analysis of the relevance of legitimization arguments within both local and international 
contexts.  
The contribution of our critical analysis is twofold. First, it provides an empirical 
analysis of a particular case study to show the specific discursive frames referring to 
sexual(ized) violence, while calling for external intervention to provide protection of 
                                                          
4 Autessere (2012, 14) notes that the emotional impact of sexual(ized) violence particularly strong as it 
involves “intentionally inflicted body harm to individuals who are socially constructed as the most vulnerable” 
as is viewed upon as the “ultimate violation of the self”. 
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civilians. Although we are grounding the conclusions in a single case, the legitimization 
strategies can be traced in other cases and thus could be used in further research. Second, 
the critical reading of Western masculine superiority indicated by contemporary liberal 
interventionism has wider implications for contemporary debate on prevention of 
sexual(ized) violence and protection of civilians in more general.   
 
Methodology 
The analytical part of the article is based on the method of Critical Discourse Analysis 
(hereafter CDA), disseminated through the works of Wodak (1996; Wodak and Meyer 2001), 
Fairclough (2003), Van Dijk (1998) or Van Leeuven (2008).5 
Our methodological framework follows Fairclough’s three-level model of analysis 
(1989, 26). At the lowest micro-level, the formal aspects of the text (depicted in the official 
documents or formal statements of relevant organizations, states and their individual 
representatives) are explored to identify the attempt to legitimize a policy – in this case the 
deployment of military operation. Fairclough utilizes the term “categorical modality”, and 
argues that it becomes an effective means to justify a political ideology as the speaker is 
presenting subjective opinions as an objective and given fact (1992, 160-161).6 The verbal 
                                                          
5 Despite its interdisciplinary and pluralistic complexion (Fairclough 1995), the proponents of CDA agree on its 
fundamental assumptions. Firstly, CDA is linking social and linguistic categories, while aiming to integrate the 
macro-perspective of social structure and the micro-view of discourse. In contrast to the traditional linguistic 
paradigm, discourse is not a mere verbal or non-verbal expression; rather, it is perceived as a form of social 
practice that constitutes changes or consolidates social practices.  Secondly, from an ontological perspective, 
CDA avoids structural or individualist determinism, while following the social constructivist conception of 
mutually constitutive relations among agents and structures (Berger and Luckman 1984). Social reality is 
understood as an inter-subjective construct, which is formed by discursive practices of actors manoeuvring 
within established power structures.  Finally, CDA rests on multiple levels of analysis including both discursive 
practices and their social context, which enable the identification of the strategic intentions maintained 
through the discourse. Here, understating particular socio-political conditions of discourse is essential for 
critical interpretation of arguments and their meaning. 
6 For instance, strong modality combined with plural in person is reflecting the speaker’s effort to convince 
about the necessity of an action through the formulations such as must, need, should (in contrast to may or 
could). 
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voice (passive or active) is also essential as it reflects the responsibility of the speaker for the 
justified action (Rativoi 2008). If the speaker wishes to present an intervention as 
unproblematic, acceptable and needed, the concrete actor is concealed either through the 
uncertain “we”, or use of the passive voice (e.g. civilians must be protected).  
The identification of the legitimization efforts is followed by an analysis of the 
strategic discursive practices internalized by the international community. Here, Fairclough 
embraces Foucault’s term “orders of discourse”; implying the systems of communication 
interlinking various formulations, genres and meanings are shared within a particular social 
structure (1992, 180). These also include argumentation strategies aimed to justify an action 
through reference to a widely acknowledged source of legitimacy.7 Discourse analysis of the 
legitimization strategies of political actors is based on foregrounding gender and ideal-
typical gender-related attributes  – in this case female innocence, vulnerability, suffering 
and helplessness. 
The third level of analysis critically reflects on the effects of the discursive strategies. 
These firstly construct a strong legitimacy of post-Cold war liberal ‘messianism’, enhanced 
by the relatively recent turn to gender-based protectionism. As a secondary effect, the 
hegemonic position of the intervening states is reproduced and further strengthened via the 
reaffirmed noble identity of selfless savior. The clearest example of such identity 
(re)construction is NATO’s image as a most prominent global security provider. These 
effects are typically indicated by the supportive assessment of R2P interventions and their 
architects in the mainstream academic debates, as well as their relatively uncritical 
acceptance by the global civil society. 
                                                          
7 According to Van Leeuwen (2008), it can be attributed to (i) political, legal or symbolic authority – e.g. the UN 
Charter or the Red Cross (ii) rational purpose – e.g. providing security, (iii) moral principle – e.g. assistance to 
those in need or (iv) historical practice – e.g. refugee protection during the second World War. 
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 From the boom in research and rape ‘tourism’ (Autesserre 2012) to the fetishisation 
of conflict-related sexual(ized) violence (Meger 2016), studying this controversial topic 
becomes an increasingly ethically problematic academic endeavour (Wibben 2016). Like 
many others who are engaged in critical feminist scholarship studying gendered harms 
(Baaz and Stern 2013), we feel the unease when discussing rape in war. This research does 
not aim to anyhow dispute the tremendous suffering of the survivors, but rather to critically 
read and interpret the dominant gendered-legitimizing discourse of military mission 
deployment. We argue that these missions in effect only serve to (re)legitimize the 
hegemonic Western powers instead of delivering actual protection to the affected civilians. 
Thus, continuous critical re-reading and challenging of the protectionist arguments, 
however uncomfortable that may be, is key to the emancipatory objective of the critical 
feminist research (Sjoberg 2015; Shepherd 2013).  
 
Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts and R2P: Critical Feminist Discussion 
The current hegemonic discourse that rape constitutes a weapon of war has been replicated 
not only by large number of scholars, but it has also remained an unchallenged assumption 
of the majority of policy-makers (Baaz and Stern 2009; Baaz and Stern 2013). The 
argumentation that rape indeed constitutes a weapon suffers from several limitations and 
may in reality damage those it seeks to protect. The following section of the paper critically 
discusses the problems of the rape-as-a-weapon discourse in its relation to R2P.  
In many academic and popular accounts, the biological possession of the male sexual 
organ makes that individual a potential rapist. From Brownmiller’s assertion that men rape 
simply because they can (1976) there is a fundamental shift to modern accounts of the 
weaponization of the penis and its use as a strategic/tactical tool in armed conflicts (Buss 
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2009). Sexual violation of women’s bodies, carrying the nation’s essence and culture, as well 
as biologically reproducing the group, becomes a terror tactic, forcing major population 
displacement, and leading to genocide (Card 1996). Drawing a clear distinction between 
peace-time (or so-called ‘everyday’) rape, which is classed as being a sexual act, rape in war 
becomes an asexual weapon used to inflict physical and psychological trauma on the target 
group. This understanding of the ‘strategicness’ (Baaz and Stern 2013) of sexual(ized) 
violence clearly leads to the logical conclusion that rape can be eliminated or at least 
managed. 
The feminist debate on the securitization of rape and sexual(ized) violence is rather 
complex (Kirby 2013). Although most authors acknowledge that putting sexual(ized) 
violence on the global security agenda represents a positive development, there is an acute 
unease about the way rape, as a weapon, is articulated and acted upon (Baaz and Stern 
2013).8 Criticizing the fact that it is men as a collective category that are considered to bear 
moral responsibility for rape in war, Kirby (2013) challenges the notion of such moral 
judgement of men as collective beneficiaries of war rape. This kind of collective blame is 
specifically what we were able to trace in the discourses analysed below, where local men 
are portrayed as bestial/brutal not as individual rapists, but rather as backwards uncivilized 
patriarchal ‘collectivity’. Baaz and Stern (2013, 19) support with Kirby’s arguments, seeing 
rape-as-a-weapon storyline as a rather “essentializing and deterministic as well as overtly 
negative towards men as such.” We agree with all these critiques, and add that the primacy 
of rape in war narratives serves the purpose of legitimizing military interventions, while 
strengthening calls for immediate action.  
                                                          
8 From the ‘sexed story’, rape has been understood as rather unfortunate, but somewhat natural part of war, 
to the ‘gendered story’ of how rape rests on gendered stereotypes and becomes a weapon . 
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R2P framework is invoked in cases of large-scale and systematic violence against 
civilians.9 According to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(2001), the nature of violence that might constitute international action and especially 
military intervention (the just cause threshold) would be indicated by (i) large scale loss of 
life, and/or (ii) ethnic cleansing. Particularly the second condition accounts for gender-based 
violence, but limits the applicability of R2P to “the systematic rape for political purposes of 
women of a particular group (either as another form of terrorism, or as a means of changing 
the ethnic composition of that group)” (Ibid, 33). In short, the strategic and political 
incentive for such violence becomes a necessary precondition for any action.  
The 2005 World Summit Outcome introduced four specific situations, which 
constitute a universal responsibility to act: genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity (UN Doc. A/60/1.2005). These atrocity crimes were adjusted by the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Article 7), which included sexual violence 
in the crimes against humanity, committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population” (Rome Statute 2002, 3). Thus, sexual(ized) violence 
was only implicitly integrated through the reference to the Rome Statute, at the same time 
preserving the exclusive relevance of strategic and politically motivated rape. 
The most fundamental problem with R2P is the lack of conceptual as well as 
operational clarity regarding the systematic nature of sexual(ized) violence committed in 
armed conflicts. While explaining the rationale behind military intervention, the actors refer 
to the emotional narratives within humanitarian emergencies rather than formal 
                                                          
9 The original 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
formulated the conception rather vaguely, when proposing that “sovereign states have a responsibility to 
protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation” (2001, 
32); but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader 
community of states. 
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procedures of international law. The R2P framework has become a very powerful normative 
concept since the very general idea of protection would hardly be contested – in contrast to 
the use of military force – especially when advocating the safeguarding of the ‘fairer’ sex. 
The argument is that regardless of insufficient confidence of whether sexual(ized) violence 
in armed conflicts can be effectively prevented or stopped,10 there is an automatic 
expectation regarding the positive effects of external involvement.  
In many instances, women and children become a synonym for “civilian”. Carpenter 
demonstrates how the civilian protection regime is gender essentialist, and women and 
children are automatically presumed to be civilians on the basis of sex, age and possible 
disability (2006, 31). Through this universal conceptualization of innocence and 
vulnerability, associated with the female association with nurturing and protection of 
children, women have been automatically awarded claim to protection (Ibid.).  
Kinsella (2011, 9), critically analyzing the gendered construction of innocence, argues 
that “the massacre of women and children signals a worse crime than the massacre of 
civilians” (Ibid, 9). She then shows how the category of women, based on their biological 
sex, is always accepted as civilian; this status being based on their sex difference to the non-
civilian others (Ibid, 16). On top of that, the laws of humanitarian protection are built on 
Eurocentric discourse on civilization, where global South nations are portrayed as unable to 
recognize and implement the protection of civilians (Ibid, 17). In our analysis, there is a 
highly visible rhetorical pairing of the narrative on the imminent need for gendered 
protection being considered a measure of civilization, which stands in stark contrast to 
sexual(ized) violence being utilized as a weapon of war by barbaric/savage ‘Other’ 
                                                          
10 In his report the Secretary General even admits that “more research and analysis are needed on why it has 
been so difficult to stem widespread and systematic sexual violence in some places”(UN Doc. A/63/677, 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 12 January 2009.) 
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masculinities (Kirby 2012; Abu-Lughod 2013; Moghadam 2014). Often, rape is said to be 
worse than death, classifying as the worst breach of civilian protection regime.  
Within academic circles there was a very limited debate on the gender aspects of 
R2P. In 2012, Global Responsibility to Protect published a special issue on R2P and 
sexual/gender-based violence. Most of the contributors concluded that more attention 
should be paid to the protection of women from systematic and large-scale violence while 
uncritically accepting the R2P conception as such (Bond and Sherret 2012; Davies and Teitt 
2012; Skjelsbæk 2012). Contrasting with these normatively oriented studies, this article 
provides a feminist critique of the discursive practices within the R2P framework, 
demonstrating its utilization of the enhancement of Western masculine hegemony. 
 
Libya’s Butcher11 – The Framing of Sexual Violence and the Operation Unified Protector 
The analytical part focuses on the NATO armed intervention in Libya to illustrate the process 
of legitimization under the auspices of R2P, specifically critically analyzing the protectionist 
discourse around gendered violence. Our critical feminist view reveals fundamental 
limitations of the sexual(ized) violence narrative, namely: (1) presentation and 
interpretation of rape-as-a-weapon-of-war; (2) selective condemnation of pro-Gadhafi 
forces collectively responsible for sexual(ized) violence; and finally, (3) protectionist 
argumentation stressing the urgency of intervention as envisioned by the morally superior 
NATO. After carefully examining the discursive strategies, we are critically reflecting on the 
effects regarding the mainstream positive perception of the intervention and the 
unproblematic credibility of the interveners themselves.  
                                                          
11 The phrase was used in the title of the New York Times article from 22 February 2011. 
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 The 2011 crisis in Libya was unprecedented both in terms of the conclusive 
interpretation of the ongoing violence and the firm international response. The official 
discourse of rape-as-a-weapon-of-war fitted with the notion of a state manifestly failing to 
protect its most vulnerable – women. This was supported by the metonym “Gadhafi 
responsible for mass rapes”, invoking the widespread and systematic nature of violence, 
and further preventing more complex and specific analysis of the individual responsibility 
for all reported crimes. This was demonstrated through the reference to two prominent 
stories: (1) the gang-rape of Eman al-Obeidi by the Gadhafi loyalists; and (2) the alleged 
distribution and use of Viagra in the state army.12 
 In March 2011, global media started to report on widespread violence in Libya, while 
calling for an urgent international response. Rape gained prominent media attention with 
the two cases triggering the one-sided interpretation of violence. As soon as in April 2011, 
the stories permeated into the UN official structures and were further adopted by key 
political representatives.  
The first major story was information presented by Al-Jazeera,13 following reports by 
a Libyan doctor, about Viagra – branded a weapon of war – found in the pockets of dead 
soldiers. The doctor said it was surely used to facilitate rape, while not providing any further 
evidence that it had been (1) distributed in the army, (2) used on a mass scale, and (3) used 
specifically to sexually abuse opposition supporters. The Viagra “proof” was then very often 
                                                          
12 ‘Libya: Gaddafi Investigated Over Use of Rape as Weapon,’ BBC News, 8 June 2011; ‘Libya Mass Rape Claims: 
Using Viagra Would be a Horrific First,’ the Guardian, 9 June 2011; ‘Rape in Libya: The Crime That Dare Not 
Speak Its Name,’ Times, 9 June 2011; ‘Libya: War and rape?,’ Al-Jazeera 19 June 2011; ‘Iman Al-Obeidi: Rape as 
a Weapon of War,’ Washington Post, 29 March 2011.  
13 See: Al-Jazeera English, 27 March 2011.  
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used as an argument supporting the charges against Gadhafi, especially after the ICC 
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo announced an ongoing investigation into this suspicion.14  
Moreno-Ocampo made a firm public statement during a press conference at the UN 
that rapes were orchestrated by Gadhafi as part of his repression politics. He indicated that 
the ICC probably would add new charges to those issued against Gadhafi and his son Saif al-
Islam (Hague Justice Portal, 9 June 2011). Moreno-Ocampo was also one of the first official 
representatives to confirm the use of Viagra as a tool of mass rape, comparing it to a 
machete (CNN, 18 May 2011). In the interview for CNN, he was mostly talking about 
investigating alleged reports gained on the ground yet these were presented as verified 
facts. He argued that the most effective way to stop rapes would be to arrest Gadhafi (Ibid).  
This came at the same time when international criticism of the intervention was 
mounting, mainly based on reports of collateral damage and unintended targeting of 
civilians, casting a shadow on the protectionist argumentation. The Viagra story and the 
ICC’s definitive statement revitalized the legitimacy of the mission. Secretary General 
Rassmussen announced at the end of May that NATO would continue its campaign until the 
defeat of Gadhafi’s forces (Traynor, 1 May 2011). 
 The second key incident was the emotional testimony of Eman al-Obeidi in front of 
international reporters followed by a series of interviews, articles and calls for action. In 
particular, CNN eagerly covered the event, presenting it as a “story of a woman in need”, 
who urgently needs protection: “(…) a desperate Libyan woman burst into the building 
frantic to let the world know she had been raped and beaten by Moammar Gadhafi's 
                                                          
14 See for example ‘Libya Mass Rape Claims: Using Viagra Would Be a Horrific First,’ The Guardian, 9 June 2011 
or ‘Libya: Gaddafi Investigated Over Use of Rape as a Weapon,’ BBC News, 8 June 2011. Compare ‘ICC to 
Investigate Reports of Viagra-fueled Gang-rapes in Libya,’ CNN, 18 May 2011 and ‘Rape as a Weapon of War in 
Libya,’ CNN, 17 May 2011. See also: ‘Rape Is Used as a Weapon of War,’ BBC, 9 June 2011. 
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militia.” (CNN, 27 March 2011, emphasis added).15 In the following months, the name al-
Obeidi was utilized by media, NGOs and political representatives as a symbol of oppression 
against an innocent woman, a hero not afraid to speak out and resist the regime, hunted 
prey seeking protection and security (Al-Jazeera, 27 March 2011).16 
The turning point in the official UN position was the speech of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström, 
at the UNSC meeting in April 2011 referring to the case of al-Obeidi. She criticized the 
Council for the absence of explicit condemnation of sexual violence in Libya, and did not 
hesitate to assess the crimes as political and security matters:  
 
given the way sexual violence spans the history of war, it should be automatically 
and systematically included in protection measures. The Council has recognized that 
sexual violence is used by political and military leaders to advance political, military 
and economic ends (…). If we allow the lack of hard data to justify inaction, it will 
always be too late. (…) I urge the Council to use its influence to ensure that any 
ceasefire agreement reached in relation to Libya or Côte d’Ivoire also entails the 
cessation of sexual violence as a tactic of war (UN Doc. S.PV.6515, 2).  
 
Instead of providing some solid evidence, she refers to one single case, which became a 
media blockbuster: “Although reports of rape remain unconfirmed — and are even brutally 
silenced — they have arrested the attention of the world. The name of Eman al-Obeidi is 
                                                          
15 And it was not only her: the experience of al-Obeidi was presented as an exemplary case indicating the living 
conditions of all Libyans: “[…] journalists had witnessed Gadhafi's firm and pervasive grip on Libyan society. A 
woman who dared to speak against him was quickly silenced. Journalists who dared to tell her story paid a 
price. It was one tale that perhaps went a long way in illuminating the need to protect Libya's people” (CNN, 
27 March 2011).  
16 For instance: ‘How One Voice Can Tell the Story of an Entire Movement,’ CNN, 1 April 2011.  
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known to all” (Ibid). It is precisely the UNSC that serves as the most powerful platform for 
legitimization with its audience being the most influential political actors. On top of that, the 
international media cited Wallström’s statement, significantly widening the audience 
reached.17 
 While NATO officially justified the Operation Unified Protector by the attempt to 
stop the state-organized violence in general (NATO, 24 March 2011), some member state 
representatives explicitly referred to sexual(ized) violence incidents. The U.S. Ambassador to 
the UN, Susan Rice, condemned widespread human rights abuses during an April UNSC 
meeting, where she also argued Gadhafi was supplying his troops with Viagra to encourage 
mass rape (MacAskill, 29 April 2011). During the debate, several countries and particularly 
China and the Russian Federation opposed the way NATO implemented resolution 1973. 
There was also a debate on moral equivalence of human rights abuses perpetrated by 
Gadhafi and the rebels. Obviously the U.S. Ambassador used the argument to 
counterbalance any doubts about the legitimacy of the NATO response. Also, U.S. Secretary 
of State Clinton made a public statement on the U.S.’s deep concerns about the wide-scale 
rape, referring to the al-Obeidi case:  
 
Since Eman al Obeidi bravely burst into a hotel in Tripoli on March 26 to reveal that 
Qadhafi’s security forces raped her, other brave women have come forward to tell of 
the horrible brutality they have experienced. (…) Qadhafi’s security forces and other 
groups in the region are trying to divide the people by using violence against women 
and rape as tools of war […] (Clinton, June 16, 2011).   
 
                                                          
17 See for example Worsnip, 14 April 2011.  
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This statement shows an attempt by Clinton to generalize the story despite a lack of 
concrete evidence. When talking about the perpetrators, it is again specified Gadhafi’s 
forces as opposed to vague “other groups”, implying a general responsibility of the regime 
rather than individual soldiers and their commanders.  
Al-Obeidi received more media attention in May 2011, when she managed to escape 
Libya. CNN stressed the role of the French embassy and the personal involvement of 
President Sarkozy, once again, using her as a representative of all Libyan women: ”The lady 
who came to symbolize the Libyan struggle is now getting for the first time the help she so 
long craved.” (CNN, 9 May 2011). In other words, she had to leave the country to find 
shelter, which was provided by the civilized West, this time by French diplomats, and later 
by the U.S., guaranteed personally by Clinton.18   
With the exception of Human Rights Watch, which used similar language while 
calling for international intervention,19 other human rights NGOs adopted a sober, more 
cautious approach. Amnesty International was publicly admitting that its investigation did 
not confirm any indicators of rape-as-a-weapon-of-war (Cockburn, 23 June 2011). This was 
supported by the critical assessment of the International Crisis Group, in response to 
uncorroborated rape allegations:  
 
much Western media coverage has from the outset presented a very one-sided view 
of the logic of events, portraying the protest movement as entirely peaceful and 
                                                          
18 ‘Help Obeidi Out of Libya,’ CNN, 5 June 2011’; and ‘Alleged Libyan Rape Victim Comes to the U.S. to Stay,’ 
CNN, 29 July 2011.  
19 After the al-Obeidi incident, HRW published a report entitled: Libya: Immediately Release Woman Who 
Alleged Rape (HRW, 28 March 2011). In addition, women’s rights director of HRW, Liesl Gerntholtz gave an 
interview where she referred to the al-Obedi case as emblematic of the war and agreed there was a problem 
of rape used as a military weapon (HRW, 8 June 2011). See also Human Rights Watch, ‘Hold Gadhafi 
Accountable for Atrocities,’ 22 February 2011.  
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repeatedly suggesting that the regime’s security forces were unaccountably 
massacring unarmed demonstrators who presented no real security challenge (ICG, 6 
June 2011, 9). 
 
In February, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning the violence in 
the country and demanding an immediate inquiry; and later, in June 2011, the International 
Commission of Inquiry published its report on Libya. The independent inquiry presented a 
balanced picture regarding the responsibility for sexual(ized) violence and did not advance 
any verified evidence for systematic and widespread rape. The report indicated that 
suggestions in the international media about the spread of Viagra pills among the Kata’eb20 
troops were “speculative” (UN Doc. A/HRC/17/44).  
In contrast to the report of the International Commission of Inquiry presented to the 
HRC, international media never focused on the rape incidents reported by Gadhafi loyalists 
or migrants, which did not fit the frame of the oppressive state responsible for violence. 
Although there were longer term patterns of sexual violence based on racial discrimination 
against non-Arab populations as well as opportunistic rapes committed due to lack of police 
control, those cases would have distracted from the simple, clear and attractive image of 
“the Libyan butcher”.  
The analysis of both official and unofficial discourse on rape in Libya shows a clear 
tendency to discredit the Gadhafi regime and present the opposition as innocent suffering 
victims. Despite the repeated disavowal of a regime change policy, the protectionist 
discourse in favor of Western military intervention reflected a clear attempt to overthrow 
                                                          
20 Military units under the direct command of Gadhafi and his family members operating separately from the 
state army.  
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the ruling elite and support the rebels.21 This was effectively implemented by NATO as well 
as UN representatives but even more visibly by the Western media. At the same time, the 
discourse on rape-as-a-weapon used strategically by the Gadhafi forces and supporters 
served as a powerful source of legitimacy for the military intervention. However, the 
conclusions regarding sexual(ized) violence were based on selective emotional testimonies 
rather than complex and objective fact-finding missions. Finally, there was a consistent 
emphasis on the sensitiveness of rapes in the Libyan – Islamic – society due to the 
uncivilized and unjust treatment of victims, which required an intervention of the Western 
“unified protectors”.  Overall, the argument on widespread and systematic violence against 
the most vulnerable provided a convincing justification for the NATO military operation. 
Despite the emphasis put on preventive and non-military measures within the R2P 
framework, the Libyan case shows the capability of Western states to interpret crisis 
situations in line with their political preferences.   
The impact of strong legitimization was mostly visible throughout March 2011 just 
before the NATO operation was launched. According to Washington Post-ABC News Poll, by 
mid March, 45% of American respondents approved how Obama administration was 
handling the situation in Libya (34% disapproved and 21% had no opinion on the matter) 
(Cohen, 14 March 2011). The support of the public further increased by the end of the 
month according to a new national CNN (21 March 2011) survey, which concluded: “Seven 
in ten Americans are confident that the U.S. will be successful in protecting civilians from 
                                                          
21 Some NATO countries including Italy and Greece challenged the decision to intervene and Germany holding 
the position of a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council even abstained during the voting. 
However, neither within the NATO nor within the UN did any member use a veto to block the strong coalition 
of U.S., U.K. and France in favour of military action. For futher reading on the R2P coalition in Libya see 
Chesterman 2011 or Hehir and Murray 2013.   
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Gadhafi's forces and three-quarters think that Gadhafi will be removed from power”.22 In 
contrast to the period prior to the operation, the performance of the allied forces was 
perceived more critically since the figures significantly dropped in surveys undertaken in 
May-June 2011.  
In the UK, the situation was quite similar with a 56% majority support for the 
intervention in its initial stage, while the respondents were specifically asked whether it was 
only possible to protect Libyan civilians by removing Colonel Gadhafi and again 54 % agreed 
(16% thought Gadhafi could remain in power and 30% was not sure) (YouGov.com, 21 
March 2011). The public support was even stronger in France - 66% backed military action 
by 22 March 2011 (Reuters, 22 March 2011).  
After a careful examination of the public opinion surveys in the three leading states 
initiating military operation, there was a pervasive support to the urgent need to protect 
the civilians in Libya, including otherwise controversial regime change policy. Although the 
surveys did not focus on the more specific issue of sexual(ized) violence, since it was a 
significant part of the official and media argumentation, we are assuming the legitimization 
strategies discussed above significantly contributed to the effective protectionist discourse.  
  In the academic reflections on legitimacy of the R2P based intervention in Libya, 
there was a strong consensus on the accomplishment of the just cause threshold (Goldstein 
2011; Pattison 2011; Patrick 2011; Thakur 2011; Weiss 2011). Although there were 
fundamental issues raised with regards to the implementation of the NATO operation, such 
as the disproportionality of air strikes to humanitarian objectives (Bachman 2016; 
Zambakari 2016); mission creep involving a regime change policy (Zenko 2016); absence of 
ground troops providing direct assistance to civilians (Nygren 2014; Sörenson and Damidez 
                                                          
22 The survey was conducted with the aim to assess support for the establishment of a no-fly zone in Libya, 
while including broader questions regarding U.S. involvement in Libya (CNN, 21 March 2011).  
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2014); and generally very disputable humanitarian outcome (Lamont 2016; Kuperman 2015; 
Vilmer 2016), scholars mostly approved the very decision to protect oppressed Libyans. The 
liberal community of R2P proponents went so far as to portray Libya as a role model for the 
future (Hehir and Murray 2013; Thakur 2011; Weiss 2011). 
Again, although the reviews were more concerned with the protection of civilians in 
general, some made explicit references to the issue of sexual(ized) violence, while 
concluding the intervention was justified (Adams 2012; Fermor 2012/2013; Jayakumar 
2014; Norooz 2015;). The platform of prominent NGOs unified within the International 
Coalition for the R2P presented a synopsis of the international response to the crisis in Libya 
and the ICC Prosecutor’s statement: “On 8 June 2011 Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo 
confirmed that the Libyan government had used rape and sexual violence as tools of war 
and repression to target people against the government” (ICR2P, 2011).  It further 
concluded the normative aspirations of R2P have been accomplished in Libya, though there 
were operational problems of the NATO military campaign (Ibid). The director of Global 
Center for R2P, Simon Adams, also believed intervention was legitimate, while arguing: 
    
there were also widespread allegations that loyalist forces were guilty of the 
“murder, rape and sexual torture” of Misrata’s residents. Doctors testified to 
“military sanctioned rape” of women and girls as young as fourteen. Given the 
extensive nature of war crimes perpetrated in Misrata, it was clearly within the UN’s 
“all necessary measures” mandate for NATO to attack Gadhafi’s forces encircling the 
city” (2012, 10).   
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Understanding R2P-based military intervention as an appropriate response to sexual(ized) 
violence is a very troubling effect of the wider problematic perception of the “just” cause in 
Libya.  
In June 2016, The NATO published a framework report on Future Relations with the 
United Nations. It maintained the UN authorized operations deployed by the NATO, such as 
the OUP in Libya, as clear indicators of shared priorities, including:  “the protection of 
civilians, including children, in armed conflict, and combating sexual and gender-based 
violence” (NATO, 21 June 2016, emphasis added). Accepting the protectionist rationale for 
intervention in Libya inevitably strenghtens the role of the NATO on the global stage. In 
their article for Foreign Affairs, entitled: NATO’s Victory in Libya - The Right Way to Run an 
Intervention, Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis (2012) argue the alliance succeeded in 
protecting civilians and demonstrated it remained an essential source of stability. Taking in 
account the highly disputed outcomes of the NATO involvement in Libya, all its legitimacy 
rested on the highly effective framing of the widespread and systematic violence including 
rape. This is a very problematic development since the protectionist discourse disseminated 
by the Western officials, academics and media is powerful enough to put aside fundamental 
problems of military campaigns and their generally limited humanitarian potential.  
 
Conclusion  
The topic of sexual(ized) violence not only attracts enormous international attention, but it 
became a powerful discursive frame to mobilize rather controversial political actions in 
response. Whereas large-scale rape in armed conflict is not a new phenomenon, the 
modern (post-Cold War) conflicts are treated as largely based on employment of 
sexual(ized) violence as a weapon of war or tactic of terror. The existing meta-narrative of 
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rape being an actual weapon of war became deeply embedded in the political legitimization 
strategies for military intervention. Utilizing the rhetoric to fit political agendas and 
legitimizing military interventions, which in many cases fail to protect the civilians, 
represents a highly problematic development. Here, the suffering of victims of sexual 
violence is sensationalized and highlighted at the expense of other, often extremely brutal, 
forms of violence and human rights abuses. This paper argued that sensationalizing the 
suffering of the victims of sexual violence for legitimization of highly controversial military 
interventions does primarily serve the purpose of making international interventions appear 
more acceptable. Critical rereading of the discourse is thus very important to prevent the 
reproduction of narratives strategically used to legitimize political projects. 
The analysis was based on the CDA, while using Fairclough’s dialectics combined with 
critical feminist assumptions on sexual violence in armed conflicts. There was identified a 
set of specific legitimization strategies, which in practice justify sensitive political actions. 
These are (i) constructing sexual(ized) violence as a weapon of war, (ii) condemning 
concrete architects of the machinery (typically one of the conflicting parties), and (iii) 
proclaiming the urgent need to protect the victims through all necessary means. The 
discursive strategies in effect reproduce Western domination in the international order, 
advocated through the trendy rubric of humanitarianism. The selected case-study has been 
celebrated by academics as the successful translation of the R2P concept into practical 
response actions. Yet, a closer look at the sources of legitimacy indicates patterns of 
manipulation and predominance displayed especially by Western media, but also official 
representatives. 
From a critical feminist perspective, labelling rape-as-a-weapon represents a 
significant step from past popular understanding of sexual violence as a side-effect and as 
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collateral damage (leading to inaction and disinterest). Particularly in the context of the 
widely accepted R2P conception, the strategic nature of sexual(ized) violence became a 
powerful push factor for external intervention. Therefore, there is a clear tendency to 
interpret rape-as-a-weapon-of-war while neglecting the incidents that do not fit the popular 
image of one-sided politically motivated attacks. The simplification and often even 
misperception of the real nature of sexual violence leads to marginalization of other victims, 
which paradoxically contradicts the very principles of impartial humanitarian assistance. 
Finally, it privileges short-term assertive responses at the expense of more complex, 
bottom-up and most importantly non-military empowerment of women in violent conflicts.  
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